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This paper uses a unique dataset to study how firms managed liquidity during the financial crisis. Our
analysis provides new insights on the interactions between internal liquidity, external funds, and real
corporate decisions, such as investment and employment. We first describe how companies used credit
lines during the crisis (access, size of facilities, and drawdown activity), the conditions under which
these facilities were granted (fees, markups, maturity, and collateral), and whether managers had difficulties
in renewing or initiating lines. We also describe the dynamics of credit line violations and the outcome
of subsequent renegotiations. We show how companies substitute between credit lines and internal
liquidity (cash and profits) when facing a severe credit shortage. Looking at real-side decisions, we
find that credit lines are associated with greater spending when companies are not cash-strapped. Firms
with limited access to credit lines, on the other hand, appear to choose between saving and investing
during the crisis. Our evidence indicates that credit lines eased the impact of the financial crisis on
corporate spending.
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In the spring of 2009, world ￿nancial markets were in the midst of a credit crisis of historic pro-
portions. While unfortunate, the crisis environment creates an opportunity to draw crisp inferences
about ￿rm behavior. In this paper, we study interactions between internal and external sources of
liquidity and show how those interactions a⁄ect companies￿decisions regarding capital investment,
technology spending, and employment. While prior research has looked at the impact of cash and
pro￿ts on ￿rm behavior, we consider an additional source of liquidity: lines of credit.
Companies rely extensively on credit lines provided by banks (see Shockley and Thakor (1997)).
Contemporary papers document increased corporate use of credit lines during the ￿nancial crisis
(Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) and Campello et al. (2010)). Others shed light on the relation
between credit lines and cash (Lins et al. (2010)) and pro￿tability (Su￿ (2009)). In contrast, our
paper examines how ￿rms choose between di⁄erent sources of liquidity when liquidity is scarce. Our
paper is the ￿rst to study during a credit crisis the demand for credit lines, the costs associated with
credit lines, the ease with which ￿rms are able to initiate or renew lines, the consequences of violating
a credit line covenant, the outcomes of renegotiation after violations, and how ￿rms manage liquidity
coming (concurrently) from credit lines, cash holdings, and pro￿ts. Notably, our study also provides
new insight into the relation between liquidity management and real expenditures during the crisis.
To learn how ￿rms manage liquidity and investment when liquidity is scarce, in early 2009 we
surveyed 800 CFOs from North America, Europe, and Asia, asking about their cash holdings, pro￿ts,
access to bank credit lines, use of available lines, the costs associated with credit lines, and their
pro forma plans regarding investment, technology, and employment expenditures. Rather than us-
ing archival data on observed (ex-post) outcomes, our survey approach allows us to examine ￿rms￿
planned (ex-ante) policies to study relations between liquidity and real decisions. In this way, we
study decisions that are not contaminated by events that may co-determine observed ￿rm behavior
but that were not part of managers￿information set when they formulated their policies (such as the
outcomes of governmental programs put in place to address the crisis). Our approach allows us to
establish clear, timely links between credit availability and ￿rms￿￿nancial and real decisions.
Detailed data on credit lines are not available from standard commercial databases. COMPU-
1STAT, for example, does not have this information, while LPC-Dealscan only has originations (not
balances), and even then only for larger ￿rms and banks. Archival data sources are unlikely to have
information on companies￿di¢ culties in renewing a line, much less on deals that did not go through.
Moreover, these sources do not provide detail on loan covenant violations or line renegotiations. The
survey instrument yields new data on all of these dimensions. These data describe the determinants
of credit lines (size of facilities), the use of available credit lines (drawdowns), the maturity and costs
of those facilities (commitment fees, interest spreads, use of collateral), the frequency and reasons for
covenant violations, the consequences of violations, the outcomes of renegotiations, and the interac-
tions between credit lines and other sources of internal liquidity (cash holdings and cash ￿ ows) during
the crisis. Di⁄erently from most papers, we gather information from both public and private ￿rms
across di⁄erent countries. Our data yield new evidence on the use and cost of external liquidity during
the ￿nancial crisis, showing how ￿rms substitute between internal and external funds in that period.
We ￿rst study how ￿rms managed their credit lines during the crisis. Firms that are small, pri-
vate, non-investment grade, and unpro￿table had signi￿cantly higher lines-to-asset ratios than their
larger, public, investment grade, pro￿table counterparts, both in 2008 and in 2009. Our data show
that the ￿rst set of ￿rms drew signi￿cantly larger amounts of funds under their line facilities during
the crisis. For example, private ￿rms drew, on average, 42% of the total funds in their lines in 2009,
compared to only 26% for public ￿rms. Univariate tests further show a negative correlation between
credit lines and cash balances.
Next, we examine how companies￿cash and pro￿tability a⁄ect the use of credit lines (size of
facilities and drawdown activity). We do so using an interactive regression model. For a ￿rm with
little or no cash, a one-interquartile range (IQR) increase in cash ￿ ows is associated with an increase
of 4% in the ratio of credit lines-to-total assets (the sample average ratio is 24%). That is, in the
absence of internal savings, cash ￿ ows increase a ￿rm￿ s access to credit lines. However, the positive
association between cash ￿ ow and credit lines becomes weak as ￿rms hold more cash. At the ninth
decile of cash holdings, for example, a one-IQR change in cash ￿ ow does not a⁄ect credit lines. Our
tests thus show that higher cash ￿ ows need not lead to increases in the size of credit lines. More
generally, they point to a substitution e⁄ect between internal and external liquidity during the crisis.
One of the advantages of our data is that we can study line drawdown activity to understand
2liquidity management. Firms with higher cash ￿ ows drew fewer funds from their credit lines, as did
￿rms with more cash on hand. In other words, conditional on having a line, cash ￿ ows and cash
holdings both lead to smaller drawdowns. Our drawdown activity results also are consistent with a
substitution between internal and external liquidity during the crisis. Notably, di⁄erent from tests
that are based on the size of credit lines, the drawdown tests are not subject to a reverse-causality
critique: smaller drawdowns cannot cause the ￿rm to have more cash in hand.
Our ￿ndings indicate that ￿rms choose not to use credit lines when they have enough internal
funds, implying a cost wedge between these two sources of liquidity. It is thus important that we
understand how lines are priced during the crisis. To investigate this issue, in a subsequent survey
(conducted in the second quarter of 2009) we gather data on the pricing of credit line facilities (both
during that quarter as well as in the second quarter of 2008). While it is not surprising that credit
facilities became generally more costly, we are able to characterize heterogeneity across ￿rms. In
the U.S., commitment fees increased by 14 basis points on average (i.e., nearly doubled) over the
crisis. For small, private, non-investment grade, unpro￿table borrowers, average markups over LI-
BOR/Prime rate increased between 70 and 95 basis points, and the average line maturity declined
by about 3 months (down from 26 months in early 2008). Other borrowers observed less pronounced
changes in the pricing of their lines. We also ￿nd that ￿rms with more internal liquidity were less
likely to pay a commitment fee (extensive margin), and that, conditional on paying a fee, they paid
lower fees (intensive margin). In other words, ￿rms with more internal funds could access lines of
credit at a lower cost, yet they used those facilities less extensively.
We also gather data on violations of credit line covenants and on outcomes of subsequent renegoti-
ations. We show, for example, that a relatively small fraction of ￿rms (10%) have their lines canceled
upon violating covenants in the crisis. At the same time, about one-third of violators do not have to
renegotiate the terms of their lines. Nearly 70% of those who renegotiate their lines report an increase
in the cost of those lines (markup and fees). Line drawdown activity is also reduced after a violation.
The last part of our analysis examines the interplay between corporate liquidity and real-side
policies. Our data allow us to study liquidity coming from internal sources (cash holdings and cash
￿ ows) and external sources (credit lines) within an instrumental variables framework. To our knowl-
edge, related papers have not quanti￿ed connections between credit lines and real expenditures.
3One might have two types of priors concerning the relation between a ￿rm￿ s internal liquidity and
real spending during a credit crisis. One is that ￿rms with more internal liquidity will be able to spend
more than those with less liquidity. The other is that cash savings and capital spending will ￿com-
pete￿for funds during the crisis (due to the shortage of external funding). We ￿nd evidence for both
of these relations, with liquidity￿ investment dynamics being modulated by the ￿rm￿ s credit lines.
At the average level of cash, an increase in credit lines does not alter a ￿rm￿ s investment plans.
Cash-rich ￿rms, in contrast, boost their investment plans as the size of their lines increases. For
example, at the ninth decile of cash, a one-IQR increase in credit lines leads to an increase of 3%
in planned investment over the next year (the average planned investment rate is ￿ 15%). The same
estimations suggest that, for ￿rms with little or no access to credit lines, investment and cash com-
pete for funds: ￿rms that save the most also plan the largest investment cuts. However, as credit
lines increase, this relation is reversed. At the ninth decile of lines, a one-IQR increase in cash leads
investment to grow by 3% (in contrast, for a ￿rm with no credit lines, investment drops by 5%). We
report similar evidence for technology spending and employment growth. In all, our estimates imply
that credit lines are an important source of funding for corporate spending during a crisis.
We o⁄er a number of new insights relative to the existing research on the ￿nancial crisis and on
credit lines. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) provide an early account of the e⁄ect of the ￿nancial
crisis on bank lending. The authors describe a borrowers￿￿run￿on outstanding bank credit facili-
ties following the Lehman collapse. Their evidence shows that banks that co-syndicated more with
Lehman experienced larger line drawdowns and cut lending by more. Campello et al. (2010) use
a survey-based proxy to gauge the e⁄ects of ￿nancing constraints during the crisis. Their survey
asks managers about ￿rms￿cash stocks and credit lines, but their paper provides no formal analysis
of how these sources of liquidity relate to each other. Nor does their paper provide a quantitative
assessment of how liquidity might a⁄ect investment; in particular, they do not have data on line
drawdowns. As documented uniquely in this paper, drawdown activity is central to understanding
how ￿rms manage liquidity in the crisis. Another innovation of our paper is to describe the dy-
namics of covenant violations and credit line renegotiations in 2008-2009. Our paper deepens the
understanding of liquidity management in the crisis and describes its relation to real-side decisions.
A recent paper by Lins et al. (2010) provides new evidence on the relation between cash and
4credit lines. Those authors survey CFOs in 29 countries in 2005, asking about their ￿rms￿use of
cash and lines. Lins et al. conclude that non-operational cash is used to hedge against negative cash
￿ ow shocks, while credit lines provide ￿rms with the ability to explore future business opportunities.
The authors, however, do not examine these dynamics during a liquidity crisis. Su￿ (2009) studies
the relation between cash ￿ ow and the choice between cash and credit lines. He shows that high cash
￿ ows are critical in satisfying loan covenants, allowing for greater use of credit lines by ￿rms (relative
to cash). Di⁄erently from our paper, Su￿￿ s study is conducted in a period of easier credit. Moreover,
his analysis is restricted to data from public U.S. companies.1 Using data from Spain, Jimenez et
al. (2009) ￿nd that ￿rms near default draw down more funds from their lines. Papers in the credit
line literature have not examined the recent ￿nancial crisis (nor other liquidity shortage episodes).
Perhaps more importantly, they have not examined the real-side implications of credit lines.
A common theme motivating a ￿rm￿ s demand for liquid assets is that those assets secure ￿nancing
in states in which the ￿rm may not have funds to pay its obligations or invest. This general idea un-
derlies theories explaining corporate cash savings (e.g., Kim et al. (1998) and Almeida et al. (2004))
and theories explaining the use of credit lines (Boot et al. (1987), Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), and
Thakor (1995)). Despite the similarities between the literatures on cash holdings and credit lines,
there is no unifying theory detailing the interplay of these two sources of liquidity. Existing theories,
however, consider the importance of liquidity under contingencies in which credit is scarce (the con-
text of our empirical examination). While our survey data do not allow us to thoroughly test and
contrast the predictions of those theories, we believe our ￿ndings may generate interest in new models
linking ￿rms￿choices between internal and external liquidity, and their e⁄ect on investment.2 In a
similar vein, for example, recent empirical work by Su￿(2009) has contributed to the understanding
that credit lines should not be treated as unconditional insurance in theoretical modeling.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the survey data in the next
section. Section 3 shows how the ￿rm manages di⁄erent sources of internal liquidity (cash holdings
and cash ￿ ows) as well as external liquidity (credit lines). Section 4 examines the interplay between
1A recent study by Yun (2009) also uses data from public U.S. corporations in a non-crisis period. Yun￿ s work
highlights the role of agency problems in in￿ uencing ￿rms￿use of credit lines.
2Contemporary work by Bolton et al. (2010) proposes a new framework for theories relating liquidity management
(including credit lines) and investment.
5liquidity management and real-side policies such as investment and employment. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
We survey CFOs from 31 countries in North America, Europe, and Asia during a severe contraction
in the supply of credit: the 2008-2009 ￿nancial crisis. The crisis period is an interesting time to
study liquidity and credit friction issues. We ask CFOs about their holdings of cash, their access to
bank credit lines, their use of available lines, the cost of those credit facilities, and their pro forma
plans about investment, technology, and employment.
To shorten the exposition, we present the details of the data gathering process in the Data Ap-
pendix. Our main survey is administered in the ￿rst quarter of 2009, when the ￿nancial crisis was
in full swing. It contains questions pertaining to that period as well as one year before; that is,
six months prior to the Lehman debacle, which is considered by many the peak of the crisis.3 The
appendix also provides a comparison between our sample and the standard COMPUSTAT data set.4
Before presenting the descriptive statistics, we discuss data limitations.
One concern is that we only have one cross-section of ￿rms. Ideally, we would like to use ￿rm-
￿xed e⁄ects and analyze ￿within estimators.￿While this is not available to us, we have a number
of variables that are measured in changes and other variables for which we have current and lagged
values. For example, we ask managers about their cash-to-asset positions in early 2009 as well as
what cash holdings were one year before. We have similar information about credit lines. These
data allow us to: (1) look at changes in cash holdings and credit lines from the time prior to the
peak of the crisis to the period following the peak, and (2) use lagged values for these variables as
instruments in IV regressions. We also highlight caveats that apply to all empirical studies that are
based on surveys. For instance, while we consulted with experts and re￿ned our survey questions, it
is still possible that some of the questions were misunderstood or otherwise produce noisy measures
of the variables of interest. In addition, when interpreting ￿eld studies one needs to consider that
3For ease of exposition, we sometimes refer to the ￿rst quarter of 2008 as a ￿pre-crisis-peak￿period. We don￿ t mean
to imply, however, that the ￿nancial crisis had not started by the time Lehman failed. Other researchers use similar
ways to partition the ￿nancial crisis period around the time of the Lehman debacle. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010),
for example, denote the August 2007￿ July 2008 window as the ￿Crisis I￿period, and the August 2008￿ December 2008
window as ￿Crisis II.￿
4Because respondents to the survey are anonymous, we are unable to directly link ￿rms in our sample to
commercially available databases. This is a disadvantage of our survey data, as we discuss in the Appendix.
6market participants may not necessarily understand the reason they do what they do in order to
make (close to) optimal decisions. Readers should bear these limitations in mind.
We conduct separate analyses for the U.S., European, and Asian samples. Our results vary only
slightly across these samples and to streamline the exposition, we report only the U.S. sample analy-
sis (397 non-￿nancial, for-pro￿t ￿rms). Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the U.S. sample.
The table presents variables re￿ ecting liquidity management, a broad set of ￿rm characteristics, and
real-side policy variables including forward-looking capital investment, technology spending, and
employment growth. The real variables measure the CFOs￿planned percentage changes in these
policies over the next 12 months. As expected, ￿rms plan substantial cuts in their expenditures. On
average, ￿rms plan to cut investments by about 15%. Planned cuts in technology and employment
are approximately 6% over the next 12 months. Managers are also asked to rate (on a 0 to 100 scale)
their ￿rms￿long-term investment prospects and also rate their ￿rms￿access to credit.
Table 1 About Here
Table 1 shows evidence of widespread use of credit lines; these facilities appear to be a critical
source of liquidity for our sample ￿rms. On average, credit lines represent about 24% of total assets,
compared to 12% for cash holdings and 9% for cash ￿ ows.5 The table shows that only 22% of the
companies in our sample are publicly listed. This is a unique feature of our data relative to other
studies, which usually rely entirely on public ￿rm data. About one-in-￿ve of our ￿rms have revenues
greater than $1 billion and three-in-ten have rated debt.
3 Liquidity Management During the Crisis
In this section, we study how ￿rms manage liquidity during the crisis. We start with mean dif-
ference tests and correlation analyses. We then use regressions to di⁄erentiate between alternative
explanations for how ￿rms substitute between internal and external liquidity.
3.1 Access to Credit Lines, Drawdowns, and Cash Holdings: Subsample Analysis
We say that ￿rms are ￿small,￿￿private,￿￿bank-dependent,￿￿non-investment grade,￿have ￿limited
access to credit,￿and are ￿unpro￿table￿if, respectively, their sales are less than $1 billion, they are
5A similar liquidity ￿pecking order￿is reported by Lins et al. (2010).
7privately held, they do not have a credit rating, their bonds are unrated or rated below investment
grade (BBB￿ ), they rate themselves in the bottom three deciles for access to external funds during the
crisis, and they reported losses in ￿scal year 2008.6 The counterparts of the ￿rm types just described
are, respectively, ￿large,￿ ￿public,￿ ￿non-bank-dependent,￿ ￿investment grade,￿ ￿easy access to
credit,￿and ￿pro￿table.￿For convenience, we denote these ￿rms collectively as ￿regular borrowers.￿
Table 2 About Here
Table 2 reports mean comparison tests for credit lines and cash holdings over the crisis. Column 1
shows that access to a credit line facility is generally greater among ￿rms in the regular borrower cat-
egories. These di⁄erences are statistically signi￿cant for the size, bank-dependence, reported credit
access, and pro￿tability partitions using a two-tail di⁄erence test. For instance, 92% of the large
￿rms in our survey have credit lines, while only 75% of the small ￿rms access those facilities.
Column 2 reports the proportion of ￿rms that have experienced di¢ culties in initiating or renew-
ing a credit line during the crisis. We ￿nd that 23% of private ￿rms in that category experienced
di¢ culties in obtaining or maintaining a line of credit, compared to 14% of public ￿rms. Di⁄erences
are even sharper between ￿rms with limited access to credit versus those with easy access (41% versus
3%), or between unpro￿table versus pro￿table ￿rms (42% versus 16%). This analysis complements
Su￿(2009), who shows that credit line access is conditional on the ￿rm￿ s ￿nancial health. We add to
this by quantifying that in the midst of a severe credit contraction four-in-￿ve of the companies in our
survey do not face di¢ culties in renewing a credit line. Later in the analysis, we use a multivariate
framework to assess how ￿rm characteristics a⁄ect the probability of facing di¢ culties in initiating
or renewing a credit line.
Column 3 indicates that non-regular borrowers were disproportionately more likely to draw on
their credit lines during the crisis. Considering the amount drawn, column 4 shows those ￿rms drew
down almost twice as much funds as their counterparts. For instance, the average private ￿rm drew
42% of the funds under its credit facilities, compared to only 26% for the public ￿rm. Firms that
report limited access to credit and negative pro￿ts drew 54% and 64% of their credit line maximums,
6A recent paper by Campello et al. (2010) sorts between di⁄erent measures of ￿nancial constraints focusing on
the crisis. Our study takes no stand on the measurement of ￿nancial constraints. The analysis in this section simply
draws from other literatures on corporate borrowing to study how di⁄erent ￿rms are a⁄ected by the credit crisis.
8respectively. These ￿ndings parallel the results in Jimenez et al. (2009), who ￿nd that defaulting
￿rms draw down more from their credit lines. Although we do not have information on eventual
￿rm default, we ￿nd that unpro￿table ￿rms have a higher propensity to draw from their lines in the
crisis and, on average, draw down more of the funds available under those lines.7
Columns 5 and 6 show that ￿rms￿lines-to-asset ratio declined only slightly from the ￿rst quarter of
2008 to the ￿rst quarter of 2009. As we show later, while the quantity of lines available to ￿rms seems
to have declined only slightly, the terms of those facilities (fees, interest rates, maturity, collateral)
changed signi￿cantly over the crisis. Our estimates also indicate that regular borrowers have smaller
credit lines (relative to assets). Columns 7 and 8 show that corporate cash stocks declined between
2008 and 2009. Declines in cash are less pronounced among regular borrowers (t-tests omitted).
It is worth highlighting the novelty of the results in Table 2. The various ￿rm characteristics
that we examine, for example, are absent from the work of Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), who
look at the drawdown activity of a select group of public ￿rms (￿rms borrowing through Lehman
syndicates). The empirical estimates we report also contrast with the work of Campello et al. (2010),
who do not provide quantitative information on drawdown activity. Lins et al. (2010) examine data
from 2005, a non-crisis period, and do not quantitatively analyze drawdown activity. At the same
time, our ￿ndings on cash holdings are generally consistent with Campello et al. and Lins et al.
3.2 Credit Lines and Cash Holdings: Univariate Analysis
This section provides basic evidence on interactions between credit lines, drawdowns, and cash hold-
ings. Table 3 reports correlations between these liquidity variables for early 2008 and 2009 (with the
caveat that we do not have drawdowns for 2008). The table shows a negative correlation between
credit lines and cash holdings in the crisis (statistically signi￿cant at the 10% level). Interestingly, the
negative correlation between cash and credit lines is ￿ve times more negative following the peak of the
crisis than in the period preceding it (￿ 0.11 versus ￿ 0.02). Table 3 also reveals a strong negative rela-
tion between cash holdings and drawdowns. These correlations are consistent with ￿rms using credit
lines and cash holdings as substitutes in managing liquidity, apparently more so as the crisis deepened.
7Relatedly, Su￿ (2009) ￿nds that used lines of credit increase from 10 to about 14% of total assets in the year prior
to a covenant violation; upon violation, usage drops to about 11% of assets. Analysis in Section 3.6 also shows that
drawdowns decline following a violation.
9The table shows that drawdown proportions are positively correlated with the size of the facility.
Table 3 About Here
We next compute the ratio of drawdowns to the sum of overall external funds (including draw-
downs, equity issuances, debt issuances, and commercial paper issuances). Table 4 reports mean
comparisons tests conditioned on borrower characteristics. The estimates highlight a systematic
pattern. The average drawdown-to-external funding ratio ranges from 23% to as high as 51% for
￿rms that are small, private, non-investment grade, bank-dependent, and unpro￿table. Within the
regular borrower group, in contrast, the average drawdown ratio ranges from only 3% for public
￿rms to 18% for pro￿table companies. Di⁄erences in drawdown-to-external funding ratios across
these ￿rm types are economically and statistically signi￿cant.
Table 4 About Here
The correlations in Table 3 suggest that cash and credit lines are alternative (substitute) sources of
liquidity. The mean comparison tests in Table 4 imply that ￿rms actively used their credit lines (i.e.,
they draw funds from these facilities) to deal with the crisis, particularly those ￿rms that were not reg-
ular borrowers. While interesting, we consider the evidence from these univariate tests as suggestive.
Next, we use multivariate analyses to more fully characterize ￿rms￿liquidity management in the crisis.
3.3 Credit Lines and Cash Holdings: Regression Analysis
A regression approach has two main advantages for our investigation of liquidity management during
the crisis. First, it allows us to check whether inferences are robust to multiple sources of ￿rm hetero-
geneity (e.g., size or pro￿tability). Second, it allows us to determine whether there are nonlinearities
in the way cash ￿ ow and cash holdings interact in explaining the use of credit lines.
3.3.1 Basic Models of Credit Lines
We start in Table 5 with credit line models that can be compared with those in Su￿ (2009). Panels
A and B display models for the size of credit lines and drawdown activity, respectively. In columns
1 and 2 (both panels) we essentially estimate two of the main models reported in Table 3 of Su￿￿ s
paper. For comparability, in columns 1 and 2 of Panel A the dependent variable is the ratio of
10credit lines to the sum of lines of credit and cash holdings; while in Panel B it is the ratio of unused
lines of credit to the sum of unused lines of credit and cash holdings. We regress lines of credit
(alternatively, unused lines) on cash ￿ ow and several ￿rm proxies, including long-term investment
prospects (denoted Investment Growth Prospects), size (Large), credit ratings (Investment Grade),
and ease of access to credit (Easy Credit). The speci￿cation can be written as follows:
LC=(LC + CashHoldings)i= c +￿1CashFlowi + ￿Xi + "i; (1)
where c is a constant, X is a matrix containing control variables, and " is an error term. Our regres-
sions are estimated with heteroskedasticity-consistent errors clustered by industry (Rogers (1993)).8
Table 5 About Here
We ￿rst split our sample between public and private ￿rms (Su￿studies only public ￿rms). Con-
sistent with Su￿, in the public ￿rm regressions of column 1 (Panels A and B) we ￿nd that cash
￿ ow enters the total lines and the unused lines models with a statistically positive coe¢ cient. Eco-
nomically, when cash ￿ ow moves from the ￿rst to the ninth decile (=0.20), the ratio of lines of
credit-to-total liquidity increases by 0.09. Relative to the sample mean of 0.47, this is equivalent to
an increase of about 19%, which is similar to the 15% ￿gure that Su￿reports for his random sample
of public ￿rms.9 The statistical signi￿cance of our cash ￿ ow estimate is noteworthy given that we
have a limited number of public ￿rms in the regression. Coe¢ cients for the control variables are
also generally consistent with the Su￿￿ s analysis, but are statistically weaker. Su￿ concludes that
more pro￿table ￿rms use signi￿cantly more lines of credit than cash in their liquidity management
because higher pro￿ts makes a ￿rm less likely to violate covenants.
We do not ￿nd this same result in our sample of private ￿rms, however. For private ￿rms,
pro￿tability is not a major driver of the availability of credit lines (Panel A), nor does it a⁄ect the
use of credit lines (Panel B). For these ￿rms, the use of lines is determined by aspects such as size,
credit quality, and growth prospects. These results are new and relevant to the literature. Recall from
Table 2 that private ￿rms had more lines of credit (both frequency and ratio of lines to assets), were
8We also experimented with the use of industry-￿xed e⁄ects and obtained similar results. Given the size of our
sample, we present the speci￿cation with the least number of parameters to be estimated.
9In this section, we study changes between the ￿rst and ninth deciles of cash ￿ ow to be consistent with Su￿.
11more likely to draw funds from their lines, and drew down more funds than public ￿rms during the
crisis. Private ￿rms are also more bank-dependent. Our results thus imply that cash ￿ ows may not be
a central driver of credit line use for those ￿rms that are most likely to rely on credit lines for funding.
3.3.2 Interactive Models of Credit Lines
The dependent variable in the previous model measures the importance of credit lines relative to
cash. However, that speci￿cation does not di⁄erentiate between positive changes in lines of credit
and negative changes in cash savings: when the ratio of credit lines to cash goes up, one cannot
determine which of the di⁄erent components of liquidity is increasing, declining, or staying constant.
Additionally, the speci￿cation imposes a linear relation between cash ￿ ow and the lines-to-cash ratio.
For example, it might be the case that cash ￿ ow helps a ￿rm establish lines, and that at low levels
of cash holdings the ￿rm will use lines to ￿nance its activities. However, at higher levels of cash,
the same ￿rm may not need to raise additional credit lines, even if it has large enough cash ￿ ows to
sustain the new lines. These dynamics seem plausible, but they cannot be identi￿ed in a speci￿cation
that collapses the cash￿ credit lines trade-o⁄ in one variable.
In columns 3 through 5 of Table 5, the dependent variables are the ratio of credit lines to assets
(Panel A) and the ratio of drawdowns to credit lines (Panel B). The right-hand side regressors include
cash holdings as well as its interaction with cash ￿ ows. The advantage of this new speci￿cation is
that it allows us to isolate changes in lines of credit (alternatively, drawdowns) from changes in cash
holdings ￿ the model no longer collapses cash into the denominator of the left-hand side variable.
To disentangle the interplay between internal and external sources of liquidity, these tests allow for
nonlinearities in the way cash ￿ ows and cash holdings interact in explaining lines of credit. Following
previous notation (see Eq. (1)), the new line of credit model can be written as:
LC=Assetsi=c+￿1CashFlowi+￿2CashHoldingsi+￿3 (CashFlow ￿ CashHoldings)i+￿Xi+"i:
(2)
In column 3 of Panel A, we report results from regressing lines of credit on cash ￿ ows.10 Excluding
cash holdings from the speci￿cation, we ￿nd that cash ￿ ows have a positive e⁄ect on the magnitude
of lines of credit that a ￿rm has available. In column 4, we add cash holdings and ￿nd a statistically
10We do not ￿nd signi￿cant di⁄erences when we ￿t our new model separately for public and private ￿rms. To save
space, we present results for the entire sample and include a dummy variable for public status.
12negative relation between cash holdings and credit lines, con￿rming our intuition that ￿rms trade o⁄
cash with credit lines. This strong, negative relation also highlights the need to include an explicit
proxy for cash holdings in line of credit analysis. In column 5, we include cash ￿ ows, cash holdings,
as well as their interaction in the set of regressors.
We focus on the full model of column 5. Given the interactive structure of this model, one must
carefully interpret the economic meaning of the reported coe¢ cients. The positive coe¢ cient on cash
￿ ow suggests that pro￿tability help ￿rms raise credit lines. At the same time, the negative coe¢ cient
on cash holdings implies that ￿rms trade o⁄ credit lines with cash holdings. The signi￿cant negative
interaction between cash holdings and cash ￿ ows delivers an even more interesting insight. Our esti-
mates imply that, in a hypothetical situation in which a ￿rm has little or no cash, a one-interquartile
range (IQR) change in cash ￿ ows (=0.12) is associated with an increase of about 4% in the credit
lines-to-total assets ratio (the sample average ratio is about 24%). That is, in the absence of internal
savings, cash ￿ ows increase the ￿rm￿ s access to credit lines. However, this dynamic is mitigated as
cash savings increase. At the ninth decile of cash holdings (=0.30), for example, a similar change
in cash ￿ ow increases the use of credit lines by only 2%. This 2% estimated e⁄ect is not statisti-
cally di⁄erent from zero. In fact, we ￿nd that inferences about a positive impact of cash ￿ ows on
credit lines are only statistically signi￿cant in samples of ￿rms with relatively low cash (those in the
￿rst three deciles of the distribution of cash holdings). Figure 1 characterizes the economics of the
interaction e⁄ects just discussed (see Panel A).
Figure 1 About Here
Another way to characterize these e⁄ects is to look at the impact of a one-IQR increase in cash
holdings (=0.14) at the ninth decile of cash ￿ ows (=0.25). We ￿nd that this change would lead a
￿rm to reduce its credit lines by about 3.7% of total assets (see Figure 1, Panel B). At the average
level of cash ￿ ow, the decline is 2.7%.11 That is, even taking into consideration that credit lines are
made available to more pro￿table ￿rms, we ￿nd that ￿rms with relatively high internal liquidity use
credit lines less intensively. Our speci￿cation is able to uniquely identify these dynamics because we
study separate (and interactive) terms for cash holdings and credit lines.
11Both estimates are statistically di⁄erent from zero. Indeed, the ￿derivative￿of lines of credit with respect to cash
holdings is negative and reliably di⁄erent from zero across the entire range of cash ￿ ow.
13Although we interpret our results in terms of how changes in cash a⁄ect credit lines, one could
also interpret them as simply suggesting that ￿rms will save cash in the crisis if they lack access to
credit lines. The next set of tests removes this ambiguity about the direction of causality. Columns
3 through 5 of Panel B in Table 5 report drawdown regression results. We ￿nd that ￿rms with more
cash ￿ ows and high cash savings draw fewer funds from their credit lines. These results are inter-
esting because they are also consistent with a substitution between internal and external liquidity
during the crisis. Moreover, they are not subject to a reverse-causality critique: fewer drawdowns
from existing lines cannot cause the ￿rm to have more cash in hand. We note, however, that the
interaction term for cash ￿ ows and cash holdings is not statistically signi￿cant.
We also check whether our results obtain outside of the crisis. To do so, we use data from Su￿
(2009).12 Su￿￿ s sample is comprised of a panel of 300 randomly selected public ￿rms over the 1996￿
2003 period. Column 6 (Panels A and B) replicates the speci￿cation of column 5 using Su￿￿ s data,
producing largely similar results. Even in a non-crisis period, we ￿nd that cash ￿ ow has a positive
e⁄ect on credit lines while cash has a negative e⁄ect. The interaction between those two variables
also indicates that more pro￿table ￿rms use fewer credit lines when cash holdings are high. The
results we obtain appear to generalize beyond the crisis period.
The tests of this section are new and relevant in showing how ￿rms manage various sources of
liquidity when credit is scarce. Although our tests are related to recent empirical work on credit lines
(e.g., Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Campello et al. (2010), Lins et al. (2010), Su￿ (2009), and
Jimenez et al. (2009)), to our knowledge, existing research does not describe the relations between
cash holdings, cash ￿ ows, and lines of credit (including drawdowns) under similar economic circum-
stances. Insight into how companies respond to credit shocks is relevant for economic policy-making.
Our results should also be of interest to future theoretical work on corporate liquidity management.
3.4 Initiating and Renewing Credit Lines During the Crisis
The tests of Section 3.3 show that internal savings (cash holdings) and operating performance (cash
￿ ows) a⁄ected companies￿credit lines during the crisis. In this section we focus on whether savings
and performance in￿ uenced the odds that a ￿rm was able to initiate or renew a credit line in the
12We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. We thank Amir Su￿ for posting his code online.
14crisis. Since the crisis led to a signi￿cant drop in corporate sales and liquidity, it is important to
gauge the extent to which these e⁄ects may have a⁄ected corporate access to fresh bank ￿nancing.
In Table 6, we report the results from probit regressions where the dependent variable equals 1 if
the ￿rm reported di¢ culties in initiating or renewing a credit line during the crisis, and 0 otherwise.
The independent variables are similar to those of Eq. (2). As one would expect, the estimates
in the table imply, for example, that public ￿rms are less likely to face di¢ culties in obtaining or
maintaining credit lines (cf. Table 2 above). For our purposes, the more interesting results are that
cash ￿ ows and cash holdings both reduce the likelihood that a ￿rm will encounter di¢ culty initiating
or renewing lines during the crisis. Their interaction implies a substitution in the extent to which
cash ￿ ow and cash holdings ease access to credit lines. However, the implied economic e⁄ect of the
interaction term is relatively small.
Table 6 About Here
The results from Table 6 are new and interesting in their own right. Note that these ￿ndings
cannot be replicated with standard archival data. LPC-Dealscan, for example, does not have infor-
mation on loan requests that did not go through. In fact, no commercial database is likely to have
data on companies￿di¢ culties in renewing a line, much less on denials. It is also worth highlighting
that CFOs would probably be reluctant to discuss publicly, tell ￿nancial analysts, or reveal in their
￿rms￿10-Ks, their failure to obtain a credit line (they are inclined to do so here because our sur-
vey promises anonymity). In the extant literature, Su￿ (2009) shows that pro￿table ￿rms are more
likely to have credit lines. Our results advance Su￿￿ s by characterizing the di¢ culties ￿rms face in
renewing or initiating a line (beyond the outcome of having a line or its size) and by showing that
the relation between pro￿ts and lines also holds in a crisis period.
3.5 The Pricing of Credit Lines
We ￿nd that companies draw less from their credit lines when internal liquidity is high. This points
to a cost wedge between internal funds and credit lines. In this section, we examine the pricing of
credit lines during the crisis and its relation with corporate liquidity.
In a follow-up survey conducted in the second quarter of 2009, we gather detailed data on credit
line pricing structure for 2008 and 2009. We obtain information on basis point commitment fees that
15companies pay to retain the line, markup interest rates that banks charge above LIBOR/Prime on the
used portion of the line, the credit line maturity (or ￿tenor￿ ), and whether banks require collateral.
Table 7 relates various elements of credit line pricing to ￿rm characteristics. Panel A reports
basis point markups. The rightmost column shows that markups increased sharply during the crisis
for all ￿rms. Notably, these increases were much higher for non-regular borrowers. We ￿nd, for
example, that the markup increased by about 71 basis points for private ￿rms versus only 39 basis
points for public companies. Panel B reports changes in the maturity of credit lines. The rightmost
column shows a decline in the average line maturity during the crisis for all ￿rm categories. The
average maturity for large ￿rms￿lines, for example, fell by 6 months from 2008 to 2009, compared to
a decline of 2 months for small ￿rms. Note, however, that large ￿rms￿average line maturity in 2008
was 43 months, much longer than the 27-month average maturity of small ￿rms. We omit panels for
commitment fees and collateral requirements to save space, but they lead to similar inferences.
Overall, the terms associated with credit lines worsened from the perspective of borrowers over
the crisis, especially for small, private, non-investment grade, unpro￿table-type borrowers. Banks
set signi￿cantly higher commitment fees and interest markups in 2009 (relative to 2008). They also
reduced the maturities of the new lines and required more collateral coverage. These base results
add to our understanding of the costs associated with credit lines in di¢ cult times. Compared to the
existing literature, they are unique in the level of detail provided and in characterizing the current
crisis in particular.13
Table 7 About Here
We use regression analysis to relate the pricing structure of credit lines to company attributes,
emphasizing the role of internal liquidity. Building on Shockley and Thakor￿ s (1997) commitment
fee model, in columns 1 and 2 of Table 8, we use a logit speci￿cation to regress an indicator that
equals 1 if a ￿rm pays a commitment fee on its lines (and 0 otherwise) on ￿rm size, ownership
form, debt rating, reported access to credit, growth prospects, as well as controls for the size of the
13Looking at the LTCM-Russia crisis, Chava and Purnanandam (2009) ￿nd that a⁄ected U.S. banks raised their loan
spreads. However, the authors do not identify whether these loans refer to credit lines, nor do they look at the other
components of credit facilities (such as maturity or collateral). Khawaja and Mian (2008) study the e⁄ect of the 1998
nuclear test crisis in Pakistan. These authors also do not di⁄erentiate between credit lines and other credit facilities, and
look only at interest rates. They ￿nd no e⁄ect of the Pakistani liquidity crisis on loan pricing. Ivashina and Scharfstein
(2010) look at data from 34 ￿rms during the current crisis. They describe ￿rms￿abilities to draw funds from existing lines
at low markups, but provide no evidence on the overall costs of those facilities, nor on how they changed during the crisis.
16credit line, the line maturity, and the presence of collateral backing. We augment the Shockley and
Thakor model by including cash ￿ ows, cash holdings, and an interaction term for these variables.
We estimate similar models in columns 3 and 4, but employ OLS and use a continuous commitment
fee dependent variable, focusing on the non-zero observations of the fee. In this way, the models in
columns 3 and 4 capture the e⁄ect of ￿rm liquidity on the ￿intensive margin￿of the commitment fee
structure. The models in columns 1 and 2, in contrast, capture the ￿extensive margin￿of the fee.
The logit regression in column 1 indicates that ￿rms with high cash ￿ ows and high cash holdings
are less likely to pay a commitment fee. The OLS regression in column 3 suggests that, conditional
on paying a fee, the commitment fee declines with ￿rms￿cash ￿ ows and cash holdings. Economically,
a one-IQR increase in cash ￿ ow (cash holdings) leads to a decline in the probability of paying a fee of
about 5.3% (8.5%). On the intensive margin, the OLS results imply that a one-IQR increase in cash
￿ ow (cash holdings) reduces the commitment fee by 9 (12) basis points, which is a signi￿cant 18%
(24%) drop relative to the sample mean. The cash ￿ ow￿ cash holdings interaction term is positive
and highly signi￿cant in the OLS fee model, indicating that there are diminishing marginal bene￿ts
to the independent e⁄ects of cash and cash ￿ ows on fee reductions. The evidence in Table 8 indicates
that ￿rms with more internal liquidity (cash ￿ ow and cash holdings) are likely to have easier access
to credit lines and be charged lower prices for those facilities.
Table 8 About Here
These pricing results are new to the literature and shed additional light on the interplay between
internal funds and credit lines. Combined with our previous analysis on line usage and availability
during the crisis, our evidence seems broadly consistent with Thakor￿ s (1995) argument that ￿rms
acquire credit lines to handle credit rationing in bad times, but banks reserve the right to deny access
or make it more costly to use those facilities (cf. Su￿ (2009)).
3.6 Covenant Violation and Credit Line Renegotiation
We conduct a third survey in June, 2010 to explore the implications of covenant violations and line
renegotiations during the ￿nancial crisis. The survey methodology is similar to that described in the
17Data Appendix and yields 396 observations. The results are presented in Table 9.
Table 9 About Here
It is important to consider not just covenant violation but also near violations in this analysis,
since both may lead to similar corporate responses. Panel A of Table 9 shows that during the 2008-
2009 period, 18.6% of the sample ￿rms with credit lines o¢ cially violated a covenant. Another 8.5%
reported a near violation.
Panel B shows that all of the actual violations were a result of ￿nancial covenants and 10.6%
involved both ￿nancial and operational covenants. The panel also shows that for those that violated
covenants, 9.1% of ￿rms had all of their credit lines canceled.14 Another 1.4% had at least one line
(but not all) canceled. About half of the ￿rms (53.7%) renegotiated their credit line. Interestingly,
for more than one third of the ￿rms, the violation did not lead to any renegotiation.
Panel C reports the e⁄ects of renegotiation upon covenant violation. Not surprisingly, most com-
panies report an increase in the fees and markups associated with their credit lines after a violation.
About half of ￿rms that violate covenants report an increase of collateral requirements and a decline
in the size of the credit facilities. Very few ￿rms (about one-in-seven) report that the maturity of their
lines was reduced. Interestingly, these changes are very similar for both violators and near violators.
We also collect information on line drawdowns before and after violations (see rightmost columns
of Panel A). Before the violation, both soon to be violators and near violators were drawing down
about 58% of their lines. After the violation, drawdowns decrease sharply. Violators drew only 34.9%
of their line and near violators 35.1%. We already know (from Panel C) that after renegotiation the
size of the available facility was reduced for half of these ￿rms. So the dollar drawdown impact is
even stronger; i.e., smaller percentage drawdown from a smaller base.
What do these results imply? In our sample, credit lines appear to provide some relief during the
worst part of the credit crisis. Approximately 81% of the ￿rms experienced no violation or near viola-
tion. Of the 19% that did violate, more than one third experienced no change in the terms of their line.
Hence, for about 88% of ￿rms, credit lines appear to have o⁄ered access to liquidity during the crisis.
14To put this number into context, Roberts and Su￿ (2009) ￿nd that 4% of a random sample of ￿rms in breach of
￿nancial covenants in the 1995-2006 period terminate the relations with their creditors. The authors also report that
net debt issuance becomes negative following a covenant violation.
18For those that renegotiated, lines became more costly and restrictive. However, cancelation is rare.
Only 7 ￿rms or 2% of our full sample had all of their credit lines canceled during a severe credit crunch.
Our analysis implies that credit lines are not unconditional liquidity insurance because of the
possibility that they can be revoked or made more costly to use (see Thakor (1995) and Su￿(2009)).
To explore this further, we ask CFOs whether, after having lived through the recent credit crisis,
they would be willing to pay for a ￿rainy day￿credit facility ￿ which could be a new facility or
simply be greater access from their existing facility. By ￿rainy day￿the idea is that the CFOs would
have no intention of drawing on this facility except in dire circumstances. The results associated
with this question are in Panel D of Table 9. More than 45% of respondents said that they would
pay a small, moderate, or large premium (30.4%, 13.6%, and 1.3%, respectively) to arrange a rainy
day facility. About 55% said they would decline paying for a rainy day credit line; nearly half of
them (22%) said they would not pay because they already held ￿excess cash for the same purpose.￿
4 Liquidity and Real Firm Policies During the Crisis
There is notable interest in understanding connections between corporate ￿nancial and real decisions.
It is important to learn about how liquidity a⁄ects corporate spending when credit is particularly
scarce. In this section, we study the real-side e⁄ects of liquidity coming from internal (cash holdings
and cash ￿ ows) and external (credit lines) sources. We note that the connection between liquidity
and spending during the crisis has not been stressed in the existing literature. Campello et al. (2010),
for example, tabulate responses to a qualitative question in which managers indicate whether or not
they use internal funds to ￿nance investment. The authors, however, ￿nd no cross-￿rm variation in
those responses, provide no quantitative assessment of the relation between liquidity and investment,
and do not consider interactions (substitutability) between various sources of liquidity. Lins et al.
(2010) consider the substitutability of cash and credit lines, but do not look at their impact on
investment in a liquidity crisis. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) and Su￿ (2009) are silent on the
relation between liquidity and real-side policies. None of these papers examines the relation between
line drawdowns and investment.
194.1 Credit Lines and Spending
We ￿rst regress real-side variables on cash holdings, lines of credit, and their interaction. We account
for ￿rm heterogeneity by including controls for ￿rm size, ownership type, and credit ratings, among
others. Following previous notation, the planned expenditures model can be written as:
PlannedExpenditurei=c+￿1CashHoldingsi+￿2LCi+￿3 (CashHoldings ￿ LC)i+￿Xi+"i; (3)
where PlannedExpenditure is the ￿rm￿ s planned expenditures on, alternatively, ￿xed capital, tech-
nology, or employment; all expressed in percentage changes over the next 12 months. LC is lines of
credit over assets. c, X, and " are de￿ned similarly to Eq. (1).
We examine each real policy in Eq. (3) using OLS. We recognize, however, the potential for endo-
geneity in the OLS speci￿cation and therefore also estimate our models using instrumental variables
(IV). The IVs use lagged cash holdings, lagged lines of credit, their interaction, and the interaction
of their predicted values as instruments for the endogenous variables in the model; namely, cash
holdings, lines of credit, and their interaction.15
The results are reported in Table 10. We focus our discussion on investment, noting that in-
ferences are generally similar for the other real-side variables. The estimates indicate that at the
average level of cash holdings, an increase in lines of credit does not increase a ￿rm￿ s investment
plans. This internal￿ external liquidity dynamic changes at higher levels of cash holdings, however.
Firms with more cash have their investment plans boosted by greater access to credit lines (see the
upward sloping line in Panel A of Figure 2). Considering the IV estimation of column 2, for exam-
ple, a one-IQR increase in credit lines (=0.23) at the ninth decile of cash (=0.25) leads the ￿rm to
increase investment by 2.8% over the next year. Given an average planned cut of 15%, this implies
a investment reduction of 12.2%.
Table 10 About Here
Figure 2 About Here
The estimates in Table 10 also imply a negative relation between investment and cash for ￿rms
without access to credit lines (see uninteracted term for CashHoldings). In the absence of a line, cash
15Details on this approach for modeling interactive-term instruments are found in Wooldridge (2002; Ch. 9). Ad-
mittedly, our IV models do not rule out biases associated with, for example, measurement errors or omitted variables.
20and investment accounts seem to ￿compete￿for funds: ￿rms that save the most are also planning
the largest investment cuts. However, as credit lines increase, this relation is reversed: credit lines
appear to ￿free up￿internal funds for investment (see Panel B of Figure 2). For example, at the
ninth decile of credit lines (=0.50), a one-IQR increase in cash (=0.10) would lead investment to
increase by 3.2%. By contrast, for a ￿rm with no credit lines, investment would drop by 5.4%.
The diagnostic statistics for our IV models are reported at the bottom of Table 10. The high p-
values for Hansen￿ s J-tests indicate that we never reject the joint null hypothesis that our instruments
are uncorrelated with the error term in the real-side policy regressions and the model is well-speci￿ed.
The low p-values associated with the ￿rst-stage F-test suggest that our instruments are relevant.
4.2 Drawdowns and Spending
Existing research suggests that ￿rms proactively drew funds from their credit lines during the ￿nan-
cial crisis (see Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) and Campello et al. (2010)). However, it is unclear
whether these funds are used to support corporate spending. Our data allow us to estimate the
relation between investment, cash savings, and funds drawn from credit lines (drawdowns) in the
crisis. Examining these relations is interesting in its own right. However, doing so also helps us
strengthen the inferences we draw from the results in Table 10 on the relation between investment
and credit lines. In particular, one could argue that the size of existing credit lines may proxy for
investment opportunities during the crisis, and that the facilities themselves need not be used to
fund investment spending.
We study the impact of drawdowns on planned investment, technology, and employment as in
Eq. (3), replacing lines with drawdowns. One limitation we face is that we do not have lagged values
on drawdowns, hence we can only estimate OLS models. The results are reported in Table 11.
Table 11 About Here
The estimates in column 1 imply that a one-IQR increase in drawdowns (=0.70) at the ninth
decile of cash leads to an increase in planned investment of 14.8%. While until now we relied on
the total size of the credit line facility to gauge the impact of external funds on investment, we ￿nd
markedly stronger, more statistically signi￿cant results when we look at the actual funds drawn from
these facilities. Our ￿ndings are new to the literature and indicate that drawdown activity provides
21￿ner information about how ￿rms manage their lines and how liquidity management a⁄ects real
decisions. One implication of our ￿ndings is that future research on lines of credit should focus more
on drawdown data.
4.3 Growth Opportunities and the Internal￿ External Liquidity Interplay
One could still be concerned that unobserved heterogeneity (perhaps exacerbated during the ￿nancial
crisis) might in￿ uence our results. Di⁄erences in investment prospects during the crisis, for example,
might simultaneously a⁄ect managers￿investment plans and their choice between credit lines and
cash. It is di¢ cult to think of a story in which unmodeled investment prospects would explain the
substitution e⁄ects that we obtain for internal￿ external liquidity; however, further exploring this
possibility takes the analysis to its next logical step.
Recall, our results indicate that ￿rms trade o⁄ saving cash and spending funds on capital invest-
ment. Presumably, it is costlier for ￿rms to cancel their investment plans when investment has more
positive prospects. Accordingly, the choice between saving and investing is likely to ￿ tilt￿at di⁄erent
levels of access to credit lines, depending on the ￿rm￿ s investment prospects. For ￿rms with a high
opportunity cost of investment (more attractive investment prospects), it will be rational to switch
from cash savings to investment spending starting at lower levels of credit lines. In the context of
our econometric model (Eq. (3)), this would be equivalent to a stronger interaction e⁄ect between
cash holdings and credit lines for ￿rms with higher investment growth opportunities.16
This is what we observe in the data when we estimate investment regressions separately for sub-
samples of ￿rms with high and low investment opportunities. The results are reported in Table 12,
where we split the sample between ￿rms that are in the bottom ￿ve deciles of the distribution of
CFO self-reported long-term growth prospects (￿low investment opportunity￿ ) and those that are
in the top ￿ve deciles of the same distribution (￿high investment opportunity￿ ). Our IV estimates
imply that the marginal e⁄ect of cash holdings on investment switches from negative to positive when
credit lines are at around 25% of total assets for ￿rms with high investment prospects (see Figure
3). For ￿rms with low prospects, in contrast, the switch occurs only when credit lines exceed 62% of
16Put di⁄erently, while cash savings and capital investment may compete for funds in the absence of credit lines,
the e⁄ect of cash on investment should switch from negative to positive at a relatively lower level of credit lines for
￿rms with better investment opportunities (since sacri￿cing investments for the sake of saving funds is particularly
costly for these ￿rms).
22total assets (with the caveat that the estimates in this latter regression are statistically weak). The
results in Table 12 indicate that the interplay between cash holdings and credit lines vary conditional
on investment opportunities in economically sensible ways.
Table 12 About Here
Figure 3 About Here
The results of Section 4 reveal novel interaction e⁄ects between alternative sources of liquidity
and corporate spending. At relatively low levels of internal liquidity (cash holdings), investment
does not bene￿t from the ￿rm￿ s access to external liquidity (credit lines). Funds in the line facility
might be used for other purposes. At higher levels of internal liquidity, however, access to external
funds contributes to investment planning in a signi￿cant manner ￿ this in a time when companies
were drastically cutting spending. We note that theoretical work on connections between credit
lines and investment is still scant. Our evidence, however, shows that credit lines played an impor-
tant role in ￿rms￿investment policies during the crisis. In this way, it is consistent with Thakor￿ s
(1995) theoretical argument that ￿rms use lines of credit for investment funding under tight credit
conditions.17 Our ￿ndings also agree with anecdotal evidence suggesting that credit line facilities
supported corporate spending (investment, technology, and employment) during the ￿nancial crisis.
5 Concluding Remarks
In 2008-2009, companies worldwide were a⁄ected by a severe credit shock. We exploit this abrupt
change in the availability of credit to shed light on the interaction between internal and external
liquidity, and on the e⁄ects of liquidity on investment and other real decisions.
We gather data through three surveys conducted in 2009 and 2010, each comprising approxi-
mately 800 ￿rms. These survey-based data are unique in many aspects, coming from private and
public companies, across 31 countries, during a crisis period. These data have features that, to our
knowledge, have never been combined before, such as information on ￿rms￿spending plans (invest-
ment, technology, and employment), di¢ culty in accessing or renewing credit lines, the pricing of
lines, covenant violations, line renegotiations, and drawdown activity.
17We note that our data do not allow us to test any of the more re￿ned predictions in Thakor (1995). His model,
for example, shows that investment might become more ine¢ cient in times of easy credit.
23From a ￿nancial management perspective, our tests indicate that the option to access liquidity
from credit lines becomes less valuable when internal liquidity is abundant (even accounting for the
fact that more pro￿table, liquid ￿rms should ￿nd it easier to establish credit lines). Looking at
real-side decisions, we ￿nd that ￿rms appear to substitute cash savings for investment at low levels
of credit lines. One can interpret these results as implying that, when unable to access credit lines,
￿rms have to choose whether to save or invest. This internal￿ external liquidity dynamic changes,
however, at higher levels of cash holdings. Firms with more cash have their investment plans boosted
by greater access to credit lines. Our results are new in showing the importance of lines of credit for
corporate spending decisions.
Our study uncovers important, new aspects of the liquidity role of credit lines when credit is
tight. We ￿nd that the ￿nancial crisis limited, but in general did not preclude access to credit lines.
According to our evidence, credit lines seem to ease the impact of the ￿nancial crisis on capital
investment and other real-side decisions, such as technology spending and employment. Our ￿ndings
provide context to observed governmental e⁄orts to help ￿nancial intermediaries around the world.
24Data Appendix
The Data Gathering Process
To gather the data used in this study, we survey CFOs who are subscribers to CFO magazine and
other executives who have been involved in previous surveys conducted by Duke University. For
the main sample, we invited CFOs to take part in the survey via E-mail on February 16, 2009. A
reminder E-mail was sent one week later. The survey closed on February 26, 2009.
We refer to the executives surveyed as ￿CFOs￿since this is their prevailing job title. However,
some of the executives have the title of Treasurer, Assistant Treasurer, V.P. Finance, or a related
title. CFO magazine sent out 10,500 E-mail invitations to U.S. ￿rms. About 7% of these invitations
did not reach the recipients (bounce backs). Additional invitations issued by Duke University helped
o⁄set the bounce backs from the CFO magazine invitations. A supplementary survey, conducted in
the second quarter of 2009, was used to gather data on the pricing of credit lines. A ￿nal survey,
conducted in the second quarter of 2010, gathered data on line violations and renegotiations18
We know annual sales and industry focus of the ￿rms covered by the 10,500 E-mail invitations
sent out by CFO magazine (these numbers include bounce backs and invitations to ￿nancial institu-
tions though ￿nancial ￿rms are excluded from our analysis.) Based on these data, Table A.1 shows
that response rates range from about 3% to almost 7% across di⁄erent sales and industry categories.
Table A.1 About Here
Comparison with Standard Datasets
Table A.2 compares the U.S. survey sample with the COMPUSTAT universe. Since the bulk of
research in corporate ￿nance is based on COMPUSTAT, this comparison is important. Because
COMPUSTAT reports information only on public ￿rms, we restrict our attention to the set of public
￿rms in our sample for the purpose of this comparison. Our survey sample includes 87 non-￿nancial
public company observations. We compare these ￿rms to a sample of about 5,000 non-￿nancial
active ￿rms from COMPUSTAT as of the end of the ￿scal year 2008.
Table A.2 About Here
Table A.2 shows that 47% of public survey ￿rms have sales below $1 billion. That ￿gure is 68%
for COMPUSTAT ￿rms. We also ￿nd that 62% of survey ￿rms are unrated or have a credit rating
equal to or below BB+ compared to 52% for COMPUSTAT ￿rms. The two samples are similar in
terms of dividend payout policy and pro￿tability. We ￿nd that 55% of survey ￿rms did not pay
dividends at the end of the ￿scal year 2008 compared to 53% of COMPUSTAT ￿rms. In addition,
16% of survey ￿rms report negative pro￿ts compared to 23% in the COMPUSTAT universe. The
two samples are very similar in terms of cash policy. Cash holdings average about 15% of total assets
for our sample compared to 18% for COMPUSTAT ￿rms. Finally, survey sample ￿rms appear to
have higher (similar) average (median) cash ￿ ows relative to those in COMPUSTAT.
An alternative dataset for studying credit lines is LPC-Dealscan. LPC-Dealscan doesn￿ t have
information on the drawdowns on the credit lines. However, it has useful information that we do not
gather in our survey (such as the purpose of the credit line and the identity of the lenders). That
database can be linked to other commercial databases such as CRSP and COMPUSTAT allowing
for richer analysis, while ours can not. In all, both survey and archival data have advantages and
disadvantages in addressing questions regarding credit lines, as well as their impact on ￿rm behavior.
18We do not discuss the details of these additional surveys here due to the strong similarities with the ￿rst survey.
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26Table 1 — Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics for the key variables. The data are gathered from the 2009Q1 CFO survey. We 
include all firms with the exception of financial, governmental, and nonprofit organizations. Planned Investment, Planned 
Technology, and Planned Employment are CFO’s expected percentage changes in these variables over the next 12 
months. Cash Holdings is cash holdings and marketable securities as a percentage of total assets. Credit Line is bank 
credit lines as a percentage of total assets. Drawdown is the credit that is drawn as a percentage of total credit line. 
Difficulty Renewing Credit Line is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm experienced difficulty in initiating 
or renewing a credit line, and zero otherwise. Investment Growth Prospects is the CFO’s rating of the firm’s growth 
opportunities, ranging from 0 (no growth opportunities) to 100 (excellent growth opportunities). Access to Credit is the 
CFO’s reported score of the firm ability to raise external funds during the crisis, ranging from zero (no access to external 
funds) to 100 (unlimited access to external funds). Cash Flow is return on assets (expressed as a percentage) in the year 
2008. Large is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the firm’s sales revenue is equal to or more than $1 billion, and 
zero otherwise. Investment Grade is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the firm has a rating of BBB− or higher, and 
zero otherwise. Bank-Dependent is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 for a firm with a credit rating, and zero 
otherwise. Public is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the firm is publicly listed and zero otherwise.  
 
Variables Descriptive  Statistics 
 Mean  Std.  Dev.  25
th Pct.  50
th Pct.  75
th Pct.  Obs. 
Planned Investment (% change) -14.73  43.11  -30.00  -10.00  0.00  345 
Planned Tech Spending (% change) -5.76  30.97  -10.00  0.00  0.00  311 
Planned Employment (% change) -5.71  33.02  -15.00  -5.00  0.00  341 
Cash Holdings in 2008 (% of assets)  12.22  15.74  2.00  5.50  16.00  334 
Cash Holdings in 2009 (% of assets)  12.56  15.22  2.00  9.00  18.00  323 
Credit Lines in 2008 (% of assets)  23.85  20.95 10.00 20.00 33.00  287 
Credit Lines in 2009 (% of assets) 24.00  21.26  9.00  18.00  33.00  282 
Drawdowns (% of credit line) 38.47  36.90  0.00  30.00  75.00  245 
Difficulty Renewing Credit Line    0.21  0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00  397 
Investment Growth Prospects (0  —  100)  63.17  24.60 50.00 70.00 80.00  393 
Access to Credit (0 — 100)  51.00  30.86  25.00  50.00  80.00  378 
Cash Flow (% of assets)  8.98  17.06  3.00  8.00  15.00  338 
Large    0.22  0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00  397 
Investment Grade  0.18  0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00  397 
Bank-Dependent    0.72  0.45 0.00 1.00 1.00  397 
Public  0.22  0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00  397 
 
 Table 2 — Credit Lines and Cash Holdings by Firm Characteristics 
 
This table reports credit lines and cash holdings as a percentage of total assets, conditional on firm characteristics. The table also reports proportions of firms with credit lines, with 
difficulty in renewing credit lines conditional on facing credit difficulties in general, and drawdowns conditional on having access to a credit line as well as average drawdowns. The data 
are from the 2009Q1 CFO survey.  Firms are defined as Small if their sales are less than $1 billion, and Large otherwise. Private firms are those not listed on any stock exchange, while 
Public firms are listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX. Non-Investment Grade firms are unrated or rated below BBB-. Investment Grade firms are those with a credit rating BBB− or 
higher. Bank-Dependent firms are those firms without a credit rating. Non-Bank-Dependent firms are those with a credit rating. Limited Access to Credit firms are those with a self-
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Proportion of Firms 
w/ Difficulty in 
Renewing Credit Line 
(2) 
 
Proportion of Firms 




























Small  0.75  0.21  0.69  42.63 24.65 25.12  12.99  13.26 
Large  0.92  0.22  0.58  27.26 21.45 20.31  9.40  9.82 
Diff. Small − Large  -0.17*** -0.01  0.11 15.38***  3.21  4.82 3.59  3.44 
Private  0.80  0.23  0.69  41.72 25.84 25.77  11.66  11.77 
Public  0.73  0.14  0.57  25.59 15.91 16.65  14.73  15.82 
Diff. Private − Public  0.07 0.09*  0.12  16.13***  9.93***  9.12***  -3.08  -4.05*** 
Non-Investment  Grade  0.78  0.23  0.68  42.44 25.28 25.35  12.02  12.16 
Investment  Grade  0.82  0.14  0.57  20.79 18.09 18.26  13.34  14.39 
Diff. Non-Inv. − Inv. Grade  -0.04 0.09  0.11  21.66***  7.19**  7.09**  -1.32  -2.23 
Bank-Dependent  0.75  0.21  0.69  41.57 25.91 26.42  12.78  12.74 
Non-Bank-Dependent  0.88  0.21  0.61  31.30 19.12 18.56  10.70  12.07 
Diff. Bank — Non-Bank  -0.13***  -0.00  0.08  10.27*  6.79**  7.86***  2.07  0.67 
Limited Access to Credit  0.68 0.41  0.78 53.86  29.12  31.33 9.25  12.02 
Easy Access to Credit  0.83  0.03  0.53  25.44  20.40  19.76  14.38  13.33 
Diff. Limited − Easy  -0.16*** 0.38***  0.26*** 28.41***  8.72**  11.57***  -5.13**  -1.31 
Unprofitable  0.63  0.42  0.83  63.60 29.25 30.40  8.98  12.37 
Profitable  0.83  0.16  0.61  33.55 23.24 23.13  13.02  12.54 
Diff. Unprofit. − Profit.  -0.21*** 0.27***  0.22** 30.05***  6.01*  7.28**  -4.03*  -0.18 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.  Table 3 — Correlations between Credit Lines, Cash Holdings, and Drawdowns in 2008 and 2009 
 
This table reports correlation coefficients between credit lines, cash holdings, and drawdowns in 2008Q1 and 2009Q1 













Credit Line in 2009Q1  1.000         
Credit Line in 2008Q1  0.926***  1.000       
Cash Holdings in 2009Q1  -0.106*  -0.090  1.000     
Cash Holdings in 2008Q1  -0.042  -0.022  0.863***  1.000   
Drawdowns in 2009Q1  0.241***  0.249***  -0.332***  -0.239***  1.000 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.  Table 4 — Drawdowns versus External Financing in the Crisis 
 
This table reports mean comparisons of the ratio of drawdowns to the sum of total external funds (drawdowns, equity 
issuances, short-term debt issuances, long-term debt issuances, and commercial paper issuances). The data are gathered 
from the 2009Q1 survey. 
 
Characteristics 




      




Small 0.244  -0.147* 




Private 0.253  -0.218** 




Non-Investment Grade  0.237  -0.166* 




Bank-Dependent 0.227  -0.076 




Limited Access to Credit  0.305  -0.234*** 
Profitability Profitable  0.180   
 Unprofitable  0.512  -0.333** 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.  
 Table 5 — The Relation between Cash Holdings, Cash Flows, Credit Lines, and Drawdowns: Regression Analysis 
 
This table reports OLS results from credit line regressions. Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A use as dependent variable the ratio between the 
amount of credit lines available to the sum of credit lines plus cash holdings. The dependent variable is the amount of credit lines 
available as a percentage of total assets in columns 3 to 6. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the ratio between the amount of unused 
credit lines available to the sum of credit lines plus cash flow in Columns 1 and 2. The dependent variable is the percentage drawn down 
from available credit lines in columns 3 to 6. All regressions include a constant term (not reported). The data are gathered from the 
2009Q1 survey. Results in column 6 are based on Sufi’s (2009) sample. Refer to Table 1 for detailed independent variable definitions. 
Easy Access to Credit is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the CFO’s reported score of the firm ability to raise external funds 
during the crisis in the bottom 3 deciles, and zero otherwise. t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering across observations of a given industry.  
 
 
Panel A: Size of Credit Line 
 
Dep. Var.: Credit Line / (Credit Line + Cash)   
 
             Dep. Var.: Credit Line / Assets 










Cash Flow  0.471***  0.060    0.226**  0.240*  0.325** 
 
0.371*** 
 (2.64)  (0.31)    (1.97)  (1.92)  (2.20)    (6.37) 
Cash Holdings          -0.192**  -0.161** 
 
-0.288*** 
         (-2.33)  (-2.43)    (-10.53) 
Cash Flow×Cash Holdings           -0.424** 
 
-0.761*** 
           (-2.33)    (-6.88) 
Large 0.108  0.191**    0.080**  0.076**  0.075** 
 
-0.044*** 
 (1.20)  (2.37)    (2.47)  (2.45)  (2.45)    (2.64) 
Public Firm        -0.089**  -0.056*  -0.061** 
 
 
       (-2.50)  (-1.85)  (-2.04)     
Investment Grade  0.026  -0.195**    -0.053  -0.079**  -0.077** 
 
-0.017 
 (0.25)  (-2.31)    (-1.09)  (-2.12)  (-2.10)    (-0.89) 
Easy Access to Credit  0.093  -0.013***    -0.022  -0.015  -0.016 
 
 
 (1.34)  (-2.58)    (-1.46)  (-0.80)  (-0.84)     
Investment Growth Prospects  -0.210  -0.121**    -0.035  -0.014  -0.024 
 
-0.007** 
 (-0.77)  (-2.11)    (-1.04)  (-0.40)  (-0.63)    (-2.50) 




2 0.092  0.056    0.087  0.112  0.120 
 
0.270 
Panel B: Drawdowns 
 
Dep. Var.: Unused LC / (Unused LC + Cash)                 Dep. Var.: Drawdowns / LC 
  (Survey Sample)    (Survey Sample)    (Sufi’s Sample) 
  Public Firms 
(1) 
Private Firms 





Cash  Flow  0.129***  0.096   -0.643*** -0.496*** -0.571*** 
 
-0.589*** 
 (5.29)  (0.93)    (-4.35)  (-3.51)  (-2.57)    (-4.39) 
Cash Holdings          -0.763***  -0.847*** 
 
-0.746*** 
         (-5.28)  (-3.77)    (-9.61) 
Cash Flow×Cash Holdings           0.644 
 
0.124 
           (0.65)    (0.42) 
Large -0.009  0.042    -0.117**  -0.112***  -0.110*** 
 
-0.098*** 
 (-0.58)  (0.75)    (-2.41)  (-2.72)  (-2.67)    (-3.45) 
Public Firm        -0.047  -0.048  -0.045 
 
 
       (-0.95)  (-1.18)  (-1.08)     
Investment Grade  0.031  0.002    -0.093***  -0.069  -0.070 
 
-0.110*** 
 (0.96)  (0.05)    (-3.37)  (-1.15)  (-1.14)    (-3.18) 
Easy Access to Credit  -0.003  0.022    -0.068**  -0.086**  -0.085** 
 
 
 (-0.11)  (0.81)    (-2.31)  (-2.29)  (-2.26)     
Investment Growth Prospects  -0.045  0.097    -0.098  -0.140  -0.139 
 
0.0104 
 (-0.88)  (1.38)    (-0.51)  (-0.66)  (-0.66)    (1.02) 
Obs. 37  149    208  189  189    1,428 
Adj.-R
2 0.055  0.023    0.161  0.249  0.250 
 
0.190 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.   Table 6 — Difficulty in Initiating/Renewing a Credit Line: Probit Regressions 
 
This table reports results from a probit regression where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 for firms that 
experienced difficulty in initiating/renewing a credit line during the crisis and zero otherwise. All regressions include a 
constant term (not reported). The data are gathered from the 2009Q1 survey. Refer to Table 1 for detailed independent 
variable definitions. t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 







Cash  Flow  -0.009* -0.007 -0.018** 
 (-1.79)  (-1.17)  (-2.32) 
Cash Holdings    -0.014*  -0.025** 
   (-1.69)  (-2.14) 
Cash Flow×Cash Holdings     0.001** 
     (2.19) 
Large 0.165  -0.021  0.021 
 (0.61)  (-0.08)  (0.07) 
Public Firm  -0.668*  -0.334  -0.360 
 (-1.71)  (-0.89)  (-0.94) 
Investment Grade  -0.101  -0.046  -0.008 
 (-0.36)  (-0.19)  (-0.04) 
Easy Access to Credit  -0.800***  -1.030***  -1.056*** 
 (-8.22)  (-9.46)  (-8.85) 
Invest. Growth Prospects  -0.007**  -0.009**  -0.008** 
 (-2.04)  (-2.32)  (-2.04) 
Obs. 318  286  286 
Pseudo-R
2 0.116  0.154  0.168 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.   Table 7 — Credit Lines Markup and Maturity by Firm Characteristics 
 
This table reports variable rate markup on LIBOR and prime rates and maturity of credit lines by firm characteristics in 2008 and 2009. 
The data are gathered from the 2009Q2 survey. Firms are defined as Small if their sales are less than $1 billion, and Large otherwise. 
Private firms are those not listed in any stock exchange, while Public firms are listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX. Non-
Investment Grade firms are unrated or rated below BBB-. Investment Grade firms are those with a credit rating BBB− or higher. Bank-
Dependent firms do not have a credit rating. Non-Bank-Dependent firms are those with a credit rating. Limited Access to Credit firms 
are those with a CFO’s reported score of the firm ability to raise external funds during the crisis in the sample bottom 3 deciles. Easy 
Access to Credit firms are those where the CFO has reported a score in the sample top 3 deciles. 
 
 







2009 − 2008 
 
Small 196.790  127.511  69.278*** 
Large 152.300  109.272  43.028** 
Diff. Small − Large  44.490 18.239   
Private 195.229  124.340  70.889*** 
Public 161.963  123.360  38.603** 
Diff. Private − Public  33.266 0.980   
Non-Investment Grade  189.299  119.179  70.120*** 
Investment Grade  184.074  155.037  29.037 
Diff. Non-Inv. − Inv. Grade  5.225 -35.858   
Bank-Dependent 171.895  114.260  57.635*** 
Non-Bank-Dependent 234.448  151.323  83.125** 
Diff. Bank — Non-Bank  -62.553  -37.063   
Limited Access to Credit  355.861  191.366  164.494*** 
Easy Access to Credit  141.252  105.127  36.125*** 
Diff. Limited − Easy  214.609*** 86.239***   
Unprofitable 213.145  117.936  95.210*** 
Profitable 190.983  128.424  62.559*** 
Diff. Unprofit. − Profit.  22.162 -10.488   
 







2009 − 2008 
 
Small 25.093  26.780  -1.687 
Large 37.289  43.368  -6.079*** 
Diff. Small − Large  -12.196*** -16.588***   
Private 24.967  26.424  -1.457 
Public 38.135  45.270  -7.135*** 
Diff. Private − Public  -13.168*** -18.846***   
Non-Investment Grade  25.857  29.050  -3.193*** 
Investment Grade  37.704  36.593  1.111 
Diff. Non-Inv. − Inv. Grade  -11.847*** -7.543*   
Bank-Dependent 25.057  27.447  -2.390** 
Non-Bank-Dependent 35.064  38.191  -3.128 
Diff. Bank — Non-Bank  -10.007***  -10.744***   
Limited Access to Credit  22.488  28.326  -5.837*** 
Easy Access to Credit  29.062  30.669  -1.607 
Diff. Limited − Easy  -6.574* -2.343   
Unprofitable 20.536  23.000  -2.464 
Profitable 28.822  31.212  -2.390** 
Diff. Unprofit. − Profit.  -8.286* -8.212**   
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.   Table 8 — Credit Lines Commitment Fees and Firm Characteristics 
 
This table reports logit and OLS results from commitment fee regression models. In the logit regressions, the dependent 
variable is equal to 1 if the firm reports a commitment fee for its outstanding credit line and zero otherwise. In the OLS 
regressions, the dependent variable is the commitment fee in basis points. All regressions include a constant term (not 
reported). The data are gathered from the 2009Q2 survey. Refer to Table 1 for detailed independent variable definitions. 
t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering 













(1) (2)    (3) (4) 
Cash Flow  -0.022*  -0.015    -0.010** -0.020*** 
 (-1.66)  (-0.69)    (-2.05)  (-4.98) 
Cash Holdings  -0.025**  -0.022*    -0.014** -0.015*** 
 (-2.51)  (-1.68)    (-2.27)  (-3.07) 
Cash Flow×Cash Holdings   0.000     0.058*** 
   (-0.44)      (6.08) 
Large 1.272***  1.261***    -0.002* -0.003** 
 (3.17)  (3.06)    (-1.95)  (-2.50) 
Public Firm  -0.985**  -0.967**    -0.002 -0.003 
 (-2.08)  (-2.01)    (-1.07)  (-1.11) 
Investment Grade  0.071  0.080    0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.09)  (0.10)    (3.63)  (3.11) 
Easy Access to Credit  -0.236  -0.221    -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (-1.20)  (-1.01)    (-5.97)  (-6.29) 
Size of Credit Line  -0.008  -0.009    0.002 0.002 
 (-0.94)  (-0.94)    (1.18)  (1.27) 
Investment Growth Prospects  -0.006  -0.007    -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 (-0.94)  (-1.08)    (-5.82)  (-6.64) 
Credit Line Collateral Dummy  0.438*  0.429*    0.002 0.003 
 (1.75)  (1.70)    (-0.12)  (-0.25) 
Credit Line Maturity (in Months)  0.045***  0.044***    0.000** 0.000* 
 (3.61)  (3.42)    (-2.25)  (-1.87) 
Obs. 160  160    92 90 
Pseudo-R
2 0.156  0.157    0.369 0.393 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.   Table 9 — Covenant Violation, Renegotiation, and Role of Credit Lines During the Credit Crisis  
 
This table reports covenant violations and changes in the terms of credit lines in the 2008-2009 period. The data are 
gathered from the 2010Q2 survey. Panel A shows the percentage of credit lines that violated covenants and drawdowns 
as a percentage of available credit line before and after covenant violations. Panel B shows, for the subsample of firms 
that violated covenants, the percentage of firms that violated financial and/or operational covenants and whether, as a 
consequence of the violation, the credit line had to be canceled or renegotiated. Panel C shows the changes in the terms 
of credit lines after a violation. Panel D shows what percentage of firms are more willing to pay now (as a consequence of 
the credit crisis) a commitment fee to have access to a credit line accessible in case of necessity. 
 
 
Panel A: Covenant Violation and Drawdowns 
 
  
      
Drawdown Activity Around Violation 
 
  
 Obs.  %  Before 
(% of Credit Line) 
 
After 










    
 









Panel B: Reason for Violation and Consequences 
 
 




(% of Firms) 
 
Operational 








(% of Firms) 
 
Renegotiation 
(% of Firms) 
 
Neither 
(% of Firms) 
 100.00  10.61      10.45  53.73  35.82 
        
All Credit Lines 






Panel C: Renegotiation 
 
   
Changes in Terms of Credit Line Following Renegotiation 
 
 
Fee & Markup  Collateral Requirement  Credit Line Size 
 
Credit Line Maturity 
 
   
Increased?  
(Yes) 

























Violation 68.75  53.06  51.02  14.58 
 
 





Yes, More Willing to 
Pay 
(%) of Firms 
 
Not Willing to Pay,  
We Have Excess Cash 
(%) of Firms 
 
Not Willing to 
Pay 
(%) of Firms 
 








      
 
Pay Low Premium 
 
30.43 
              
 
Pay Medium Premium 
 
13.56 
              
 
Pay High Premium 
 
1.28 
              
 Table 10 - The Interplay between Cash Holdings and Credit Lines in the Corporate Spending Process 
 
This table reports OLS and Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation results from planned expenditure regressions. The 
data are gathered from the 2009Q1 survey. Refer to Table 1 for detailed variable definitions. Test-statistics reported in 
parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering across observations of a 
given industry using the 2-Step GMM estimator. The table also reports diagnostic statistics for instruments’ 






























 (-0.52)  (-2.14)    (-0.02)  (-1.93)    (-2.12)  (-0.51) 
 





 (-3.43)  (-3.00)    (-1.01)  (-2.58)    (-0.14)  (-1.73) 
 





 (1.78)  (2.53)    (1.19)  (2.75)    (1.55)  (0.76) 





 (0.62)  (0.54)    (0.85)  (0.88)    (1.50)  (1.54) 
Public Firm  -0.061  -0.049    -0.112 -0.110    -0.017 -0.030* 
 (-1.54)  (-1.26)    (-1.23)  (-1.21)    (-0.95)  (-1.94) 





 (0.84)  (0.97)    (1.09)  (1.17)    (0.58)  (-0.42) 





 (2.57)  (2.74)    (1.73)  (1.94)    (3.96)  (1.99) 
 

















Hansen’s'J-Stat. (p-val.)   0.618     0.760     0.233 
 





Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.  Table 11 — The Interplay between Cash Holdings and Drawdowns in the Corporate Spending Process 
 
This table reports OLS estimation results from investment regressions. The data are gathered from the 
2009Q1 survey. Refer to Table 1 for detailed variable definitions. Test-statistics reported in parentheses are 













Cash Holdings  -0.352*    -0.216**    -0.026 
 (-1.74)    (-2.05)    (-0.10) 
Drawdowns  -0.142***    -0.099***    -0.077*** 
 (-4.49)    (-3.23)    (-3.2) 
Cash Holdings×Drawdowns  1.416***    0.869***    0.190 
 (3.01)    (2.83)    (0.46) 
Large 0.014    0.032***    0.012 
 (0.34)    (3.35)    (0.35) 
Public Firm  -0.027    -0.008    -0.044** 
 (-0.78)    (-0.43)    (-2.36) 
Investment Grade  0.034    -0.023    0.004 
 (0.66)    (-0.53)    (0.28) 
Easy Access to Credit  0.123***    0.044***    0.019 
 (3.72)    (2.99)    (0.83) 
Obs. 176    172    181 
 
Adj.-R





Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.  Table 12 — The Interplay between Cash Holdings and Credit Lines in the Investment Process Conditional on 
Growth Prospects  
 
This table reports Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation results from investment regressions for firms below and above 
the sample median Investment Growth Prospects. The data are gathered from the 2009Q1 survey. Refer to Table 1 for 
detailed variable definitions. Test-statistics reported in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors adjusted for clustering across observations of a given industry using the 2-Step GMM estimator. The table also 
reports diagnostic statistics for instruments’ overidentification (Hansen’s J-stat p-values reported) and first-stage F-test 
of excluded instruments (lowest p-values reported). 
 
 
Below Median  
Investment Prospects 











Cash Holdings  0.200  -0.272    -0.708** -0.790 
 (0.52)  (-0.83)    (-2.45)  (-1.64) 
Credit Line  0.157  -0.102    -0.561*** -0.461 
 (1.26)  (-0.49)    (-3.90)  (-1.55) 
Cash Holdings×Credit Line  -0.423  0.428    3.380*** 3.499*** 
 (-0.46)  (0.48)    (6.76)  (2.58) 
Large 0.028  0.030    0.039 0.041 
  (0.58) (0.63)    (0.75) (1.00) 
Public Firm  0.004  -0.017    -0.067 -0.053 
 (0.05)  (-0.22)    (-1.58)  (-1.17) 
Investment Grade  -0.041  -0.028    0.016 0.011 
 (-0.45)  (-0.33)    (0.24)  (0.18) 
Easy Access to Credit  -0.020  -0.037    0.107*** 0.117*** 
 (-0.35)  (-0.66)    (3.80)  (6.07) 
 









Diagnostic Statistics    
 
  
Hansen’s'J-Stat. (p-val.)   0.934     0.368 
 
First-Stage F-test (lowest p-val.)   <0.001 
 
 <0.001 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tail) test levels, respectively.  
  Figure 1 — Economic Effect of Internal Liquidity on Credit Lines 
 
This figure depicts the sensitivity of credit lines to internal liquidity. Panel A shows the percentage change in credit lines 
[vertical axis] associated with a one-interquartile range (IQR) change in cash flows (=0.12) at different levels of cash 
holdings [horizontal axis]. Panel B shows the percentage change in credit lines associated with a one-IQR change in cash 
holdings (=0.12) at different levels of cash flows. 
 




































Economic Effect of Cash Holdings on Credit Lines
 
Panel B - Sensitivity of Credit Lines to 1 IQR Change in Cash Holdings at Different 






































Economic Effect of Cash Flows on Credit Lines
 Figure 2 — Economic Effect of Liquidity on Investment 
 
This figure depicts the sensitivity of planned investment to liquidity. Panel A shows the percentage change in investment 
[vertical axis] associated with a one-interquartile range (IQR) change in lines of credit (=0.23) at different levels of cash 
holdings [horizontal axis]. Panel B shows the percentage change in investment associated with a one-IQR change in cash 
holdings (=0.10) at different levels of credit lines. 
 





































Economic Effect of Cash Holdings on Investment
 
Panel B - Sensitivity of Investment to 1 IQR Change in Cash Holdings at Different 





































Economic Effect of Credit Lines on Investment
 Figure 3 — Economic Effect of Liquidity on Investment by Growth Prospects 
 
This figure depicts the sensitivity of planned investment to liquidity for firms with low and high growth prospects. The 
solid line shows the percentage change in investment [vertical axis] associated with a one-interquartile range (IQR) 
change in cash holdings (=0.10) at different levels of credit lines [horizontal axis] for firms in the bottom five deciles of 
the distribution of CFO self-reported long-term prospects (“Low Growth Prospects”). The dashed line shows the 
percentage change in investment associated with a one-IQR change in cash holdings (=0.10) at different levels of credit 
lines for firms in the top five deciles of the distribution of CFO self-reported long-term prospects (“High Growth 
Prospects”). 
 
Sensitivity of Investment to 1 IQR Change in Cash Holdings at Different Levels of 










































Table A1 — Survey Invitations and Response Rates 
 
This table reports number of invitations, responses, and response rates by size category and industry types. The number 
of invitations includes the 10,500 E-mail invitations sent out by CFO magazine in the first quarter of 2009. The figures 
include the E-mail invitations that did not reach the intended recipients (“bounce backs”) and financial firms. The 
financial firms are not used in the analysis in the paper. 
 
Characteristics  Category  Number of Invitations  Number of Responses  Response Rate (%) 
Size (Sales)  Small (< $1 Billion)  7,165  405  5.7% 
  Large (>= $1 Billion)  3,335  138  4.1% 
       
Industry Retail/Wholesale  1,166  77  6.6% 
 Manufacturing  2,471  132  5.3% 
 Mining  504  26  5.2% 
 Transportation  563  29  5.2% 
 Communication  406  10  2.5% 
 Software/Biotech  511  27  5.3% 
 Services  764  48  6.3% 
 Healthcare  807  40  5.0% 
 Banking/Finance/Insurance  2,359  71  3.0% 
 Other  1,451  73  6.8% 
  Table A2 — Survey and COMPUSTAT Samples 
 
This table compares public firms in the CFO survey sample with active firms in the COMPUSTAT database as of 
2009Q1. We report the number of observations and percentages based on several firm characteristics. We also report 
basic descriptive statistics on cash holdings for the two samples. We include all firms with the exception of financial, 
governmental, and nonprofit organizations. Firms are defined as Small if their sales are less than $1 billion, and Large 
otherwise. Non-Investment Grade firms are unrated or rated below BBB-. Investment Grade firms are those with a credit 
rating BBB− or higher. Cash Holdings is the ratio of cash holdings and marketable securities to total assets. Cash Flow is 
return on assets. 
 
Firm Types  Survey Sample COMPUSTAT  Sample 
  Obs. (N)  Freq. (%)  Obs. (N)  Freq. (%) 
Small 41  47%  3,647  68% 
Large 46  53%  1,698  32% 
       
Non-Investment Grade  54  62%  997  52% 
Investment Grade  33  38%  907  48% 
       
Non-Dividend Payer  46  53%  2,667  55% 
Dividend Payer  41  47%  2,173  45% 
       
Unprofitable 11  16%  1,152  23% 
Profitable 58  84%  3,875  77% 
       
 Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
Cash  Holdings  0.146 0.071 0.178  0.078 
Cash  Flow  0.076 0.080 0.044  0.082 
   